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Highlights 
• Cultural distance between borrowers and arrangers constitute information and effort costs. 
• Culturally distant arrangers suffer from moral hazard, that is, shirking in monitoring. 
• Culturally distant arrangers hold high lending shares to overcome moral hazard. 
• Relationship between borrower and culturally distant arranger reduces moral hazard. 
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Abstract 
Do cultural differences between lender and borrower affect the structure of the loan syndicate? 
Analyzing 8,031 syndicated loans to US borrowers signed between 1986 and 2007, we find that 
lending shares are higher for foreign arrangers than domestic arrangers. Among foreign arrangers, 
lending shares further increase with cultural distance. We interpret this as a result of an increased 
moral hazard problem driven by higher information and effort costs faced by foreign arrangers. 
However, previous interactions between borrowers and arrangers can reduce moral hazard, hence 
culturally distant arrangers are able to form diffused syndicates.  
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1. Introduction 
This study investigates whether cultural differences between the arranger and the borrower affect the 
structure of the loan syndicate. In the syndicated loan market, the arranger negotiates the terms of the 
contract with the borrower, and then invites participants to fund part of the loan. In order to avoid the 
cost associated with multiple-creditor monitoring, participants delegate monitoring and administrative 
responsibilities to the arranger who bears the monitoring cost in return for additional fee income (Boot 
and Thakor, 2000; Hauswald and Marquez, 2006). This setting can however reduce the incentive of 
arrangers when there is no net advantage of acting as a delegated monitor (Diamond, 1984). This 
incentive problem for the delegated monitor can be severe if gathering private information requires 
substantial additional cost, as is the case when the distance – either geographically or culturally – 
between borrower and lender is large. Arrangers have to bear the monitoring cost, yet retain only a 
fraction of the loan. Therefore, arrangers could lack the incentive to provide the optimal level of 
efforts (Ivashina, 2009; Lin et al. 2012; Sufi, 2007). Because monitoring efforts are costly and 
unobservable, arrangers must retain a higher share of the loan in order to credibly commit to a 
sufficient level of monitoring vis-à-vis the syndicate’s other participants (Diamond, 1984). Otherwise, 
a moral hazard problem would arise (Bharath et al., 2011; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997; Sufi, 2007). In 
this study, we investigate whether this moral hazard problem is especially severe for foreign arrangers 
who are culturally distant, whether it affects the syndicate structure and how it can be overcome. We 
hypothesize that cultural distance between arrangers and borrowers increases monitoring cost and 
moral hazard. Consequently, we expect that distant arrangers need to retain higher lending shares in 
order to credibly commit to proper monitoring.   
In this study, we perceive the existence of natural and cultural barriers in the communication 
between arrangers and borrowers. Geographical distance alone constitutes such a barrier (Mian, 2006). 
Furthermore, translations are required to effectively communicate in case of differing languages, 
which might create mis-understandings because words are interpreted differently across cultures. 
Furthermore, Adair et al. (2001), Brett and Okumura (1998) and Ting-Toomey (2007) argue that 
cognitive, behavioral and emotional constraints hinder effective communication among different 
cultures while sharing similar norms and codes facilitates communication. For example, senior 
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managers are given high status in Asian cultures and are selected as negotiators, but they might find it 
inappropriate to negotiate with younger, more subordinate people chosen in Anglo-Saxon cultures. 
Managers from individualistic and egalitarian cultures prefer direct and straightforward 
communication. Thus, they have a different idea of how to efficiently and effectively communicate 
than managers from hierarchical cultures who prefer to pass information through multiple managerial 
layers. Overall, these attributes are determining factors in the process of negotiation and financial 
contract design. More specifically in the context of syndicated lending, distance, as well as language 
and cultural differences make the arranger’s monitoring task more difficult. 
This study relates closely to two prominent studies and provides complementary evidence as 
far as distant lenders are concerned. First of all, Mian (2006) provides empirical evidence that greater 
cultural and geographical distance between a foreign bank's headquarters and its local branches leads 
to reduced lending to "informationally difficult" yet fundamentally sound firms that require relational 
contracting. On the other hand, Petersen and Rajan (2002) show that lender productivity and 
technology improvements increase access to credit for remote firms, enabling such firms to move 
beyond local loan markets and communicate with lenders in more impersonal ways. Contrary to 
Petersen and Rajan (2002), we argue that although communicating with lenders and getting hard 
information is relatively easy due to technology advancements, acquiring soft information is still an 
obstacle. Geographical distance, legal or cultural differences can also hinder the acquisition of 
information. As noted by Giannetti and Yafeh (2012), cultural differences increase contracting cost. 
The effect may be non-pecuniary, if interaction with culturally distant borrowers increases the lenders’ 
disutility from writing the contract. We therefore look specifically at cultural differences in the 
syndicated loan market.  
The existing evidence regarding borrower-lender distance focuses on loan pricing and gives 
evidence of spatial price discrimination, that is, a negative relationship between borrower-lender 
distance and loan cost.
1
 In contrast, we study the impact of borrower-lender distance on syndicate 
structure. There are a number of studies investigating the asymmetric information problem by 
                                                          
1
 SeeAgarwal and Hauswald (2010), Degryse and Ongena (2005), Giannetti and Yafeh (2012) and Knyazeva and 
Knyazeva (2012). 
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analyzing syndicate structure. These studies differ, however, with respect to the proposed syndicate 
structure determinants; either it is the borrowers' opaqueness, lead arrangers' reputation or both.
2
 One 
strand of literature confirms that informed lead arrangers do not exploit the opacity of the borrowers 
and participants require the lead arrangers to retain a higher share of the loan and form smaller, more 
concentrated syndicates (Jones et al., 2005; Lee and Mullineaux, 2004; Lee et al., 2010; Simons, 
1993). Some studies focus only on the reputation of the lead arranger and conclude that reputed lead 
arrangers retain a higher share and form a more concentrated syndicate (Pichler and Wilhelm, 2001; 
Ross, 2010; Sufi, 2007). In contrast, Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) highlight that lead arrangers are 
more likely to syndicate out loans when the loan is large, the borrowing firm is public, and the lead 
arranger has a strong reputation. Overall, these studies focus on domestic lending and we contribute to 
this literature by focusing on the arranger-borrower distance as an additional determinant of the 
syndicate structure.
3
 
In summary, the contributions of our study are in twofold: Firstly, to the best of our 
knowledge we are the first to directly study how foreign, culturally distant arrangers form syndicates. 
Thus we innovate by analyzing syndicate structure as determined by the cultural distance between lead 
bank and borrower. Secondly, we consider how this borrower-lender distance can be overcome. The 
remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes our sample and methodology. 
Section 3 presents our regression results. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Data and methodology 
Our sample originates from the Loan Pricing Corporation’s DealScan database and consists of 8,031 
syndicated loan deals advanced to 4,353 US firms between 1986 and 2007. As such, we apply three 
filters regarding sample period, borrower nationality and number of arrangers. Firstly, in accordance 
with Haselmann and Wachtel (2011) and Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010), we exclude loans signed 
                                                          
2
See Schure et al. (2005) for a theory of loan syndication. Note that the decisions on whether to syndicate a loan 
and how to structure the syndicate are related to the decision of loan tranching. Here, lenders decide to split a 
loan deal into separate tranches with different lender groups forming separate, tranche-specific syndicates. For a 
discussion of the determinants and economic value of tranching see Cumming et al. (2010) and Maskara (2010). 
3
Giannetti and Yafeh (2012) study the cultural distance between lead banks and participant banks and show that 
participant banks hold smaller portions of loans syndicated by culturally remote banks. 
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during 2007-2008 financial crisis, as crisis-induced credit rationing will allow only the best borrowers 
to raise syndicated loans, and the nature and effects of information asymmetry may differ greatly for 
these borrowers. Secondly, we restrict our sample to loans granted to US borrowers as DealScan’s 
coverage of non-US loans is limited, particularly, during the early part of our sample period and 
lending share information is often missing for non-US loans.
4
 Our US sample covers a substantial 
fraction of the global syndicated loan market and is in line with the empirical literature on syndicate 
structure (Jones et al. 2005, Sufi 2007, Panyagometh and Roberts 2010). Thirdly, by including only 
single arranger loans, we follow Panyagometh and Roberts (2010:279) who recognize the ambiguity 
involved in measuring lending shares of multiple lead arrangers: “Such ambiguity could arise over 
whether to count the shares of lead banks invited to participate in the original lead, as lead bank shares 
or shares syndicated out by the original lead.” Coleman, Esho, and Sharpe (2006) analyze single 
arranger loans due to the small number of loans with multiple lead lenders. As Deal Scan reports a 
single arranger for 78% of loans to US borrowers, excluding multiple arranger loans will not 
substantially reduce our sample.
5
 Despite these three filters, our sample of 8,031 loans is substantially 
larger than samples used in related studies: Panyagometh and Roberts (2010) base their analysis on 
6,304 loans to US borrowers, Sufi (2007) uses 4,414 loans to US borrowers, Dennis and Mullineaux 
(2000) rely on a sample of 3,410 loans and Bosch and Steffen (2011) analyze 367 loans to UK 
borrowers. In line with Sufi (2007), we conduct our analysis at the deal level and estimate an OLS 
model. Our dependent variable arranger’s lending share measures syndicate structure as the fraction 
of the deal funded by the arranger.  
Firstly, we identify the arranger’s nationality by the location of its headquarter and create a 
foreign arranger dummy which is set to one for arrangers with headquarters outside the US. Here we 
follow Bloom et al.’s (2009) argument that the culture of the headquarter country affects a company’s 
organizational culture and the degree of centralization of its subsidiaries. Our sample covers arrangers 
                                                          
4
 For our sample period from 1986 to 2007, 53% of loans reported in DealScan are raised by US borrowers. 
During the early years, however, the coverage is dominated by US borrowers with 93% and 73% for 1986-1990 
and 1991-1995, respectively. Overall, less than 25% of all loans to non-US borrowers have some but not 
necessarily complete information on arranger lending shares.  
5
We nevertheless conduct robustness checks by adding loans with multiple arrangers from the same country to 
our sample. Our sample size increases by only 12%. Results are robust and available upon request. In-depth 
analyses, i.e. of the endogenous choices between single versus multiple arrangers or between domestic versus 
foreign versus mixed arranger groups, are beyond the scope of this paper but are avenues for future research. 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
7 
 
from 20 countries including the US (6,745 of the 8,031 deals) followed by UK (452), Canada (305), 
France (148), Switzerland (123), The Netherlands (99), Japan (61) and Germany (53).
6
 Secondly, we 
specifically measure cultural distance following Inglehart and Welzel (2005), again based on the 
location of the arranger’s headquarters. They analyze the World Values Surveys (WVS), which are 
designed to measure all major categories of human concern, from religion to politics to economic and 
social life and find that two dimensions dominate: (1) Traditional vs. Secular-rational values and (2) 
Survival vs. Self-expression values. These two dimensions explain more than 70 percent of the cross-
cultural variance across the individual WVS categories. Their cultural distance measure is a 
combination of both dimensions. For our own proxy, we calculate the Euclidean distance of these 
values between the arranger’s country and the US. By using Euclidean distances, we focus on the 
absolute degree of difference with respect to – for example – traditionalism, but we do not measure 
whether a country is more or less traditional than the US. Thus, an arranger from a country that is 50% 
more traditional than the US is culturally equally distant as an arranger from a country that is 50% less 
traditional than the US.  
In addition, we use a number of control variables including borrower and loan characteristics, 
which have been shown to influence the syndicate structure (Champagne and Coggins, 2012; Dennis 
and Mullineaux, 2000; Esty and Megginson, 2003; Giannetti and Yafeh, 2012; Lee and Mullineaux, 
2004; Sufi, 2007). We use both borrower size and loan size as well as other loan characteristics 
including loan maturity, the existence of multiple tranches in the deal, whether the deal is senior or 
secured or has covenants attached to it. We also use measures for the degree of information 
asymmetry between borrower and lender.  Sufi (2007) shows that arrangers form concentrated 
syndicates for informational opaque borrowers, that is, borrowers without publicly traded securities or 
rating. Bosch and Steffen (2011) also show the importance of ratings in the information production 
and argue that this information production increases access to capital. However, information 
asymmetry can be overcome by arranger reputation, as the loss of reputation counter-balances an 
arranger’s moral hazard problem. Similarly, information asymmetry is reduced if a borrower has 
                                                          
6
The remaining arranger countries are: Austria, Australia, Bahrain, Bulgaria, China, Finland, Greece, Israel, 
Italy, Norway, Puerto Rico, Serbia. In total, there are 104 foreign and 239 US arrangers. 
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previously accessed the syndicated loan market in general (previous borrower) or with the aid of the 
same arranger (former arranger). Finally, we control for borrower industry, loan type, loan purpose, 
and year of loan signing in our regressions. Table A1 in the Appendix presents our variable definitions 
and sources in detail. 
 
3. Results 
Table 1 presents our sample of 8,031 syndicated loan deals advanced to 4,353 US firms between 1986 
and 2007. US banks arrange 6,745 deals while foreign banks arrange 1,286 deals. Compared to US 
banks, foreign banks arrange on average smaller loans ($ 262 million vs. $ 369 million) to larger 
borrowers ($ 1,290 million vs. $ 2,179 million). However, there are no substantial differences in 
lending to opaque or previous borrowers. Not surprisingly, arranger reputation is on average lower 
(0.18% vs. 1.14%) and lending shares are higher (39% vs. 34%) for foreign than US arrangers. Next, 
we investigate whether these differences in lending shares can be explained by the cultural distance 
between borrower and arranger. 
 
  
Units Mean 
Standard 
deviation Mean 
Standard 
deviation
Loan characteritics
  Loan size $ million 261.88 455.84 368.86 875.65 6.45 ***
  Loan maturity days 1,395.47 760.47 1,415.42 8,834.13 0.18
  Senior dummy 0.93 0.26 0.96 0.20 3.81 ***
  Secured dummy 0.50 0.50 0.43 0.49 -4.72 ***
  Covenants dummy 0.49 0.50 0.61 0.49 7.43 ***
  Multiple tranches dummy 0.30 0.46 0.26 0.44 -3.17 ***
Borrower characteristics
  Borrower size $ million 1,289.96 5,180.86 2,178.86 9,352.63 4.83 ***
  Opaque borrower dummy 0.62 0.49 0.60 0.49 -1.32
  Previous borrower number of loans 2.28 1.92 2.15 1.78 -2.26 **
Arranger characteristics
  Arranger reputation % 0.18 0.44 1.14 2.04 34.59 ***
  Former arranger dummy 0.46 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.60
  Arranger's lending share % 38.53 29.38 34.03 26.70 -5.11 ***
Descriptive statistics are based on our sample of 8,031 deals of which 1,286 are arranged by a foreign arrangers and
6,745 are arranged by a US arranger. The t-test tests for differences in the means for the sample of US versus foreign
arrangers assuming unequal variances. The null hypothesis postulates a mean-difference of zero against the
alternative hypothesis of non-zero mean differences. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively. 
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Loans arranged by
t-test for 
differences 
in mean
Foreign arranger US arranger
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Panel A of Table 2 presents our regression analyses with respect to the determinants of 
syndicate structure. Regression 1 considers our simple foreign arranger dummy. Its coefficient is 
significantly positive, indicating that foreign arrangers hold larger lending shares than US arrangers. 
This result is consistent with our moral hazard view of syndicated lending: Foreign arrangers face 
higher moral hazard due to higher monitoring cost than their domestic counterparts. However, by 
selecting an appropriate (e.g. higher) lending share, foreign arrangers can credibly commit to 
monitoring. Regression 2 confirms that this effect holds, though at a lower significance level, after 
controlling for other factors influencing the degree of information asymmetry between borrower and 
lender. In line with Lee and Mullineaux (2004), Panyagometh and Roberts (2010) and Sufi (2007), we 
find that arranger characteristics are strongly related to syndicate structure: Arranger reputation 
mitigates against moral hazard. Arrangers who reduce information asymmetries vis-à-vis the borrower 
through prior loan arrangement can also hold lower lending shares. Regarding the latter, our results are 
in line with Sufi (2007) and suggest the presence of a moral hazard rather than adverse selection 
problem in syndicated lending.
7
 Next we investigate whether- in addition to the arranger’s foreignness 
- its degree of foreignness matters. Regressions 3 and 4 indicate that this is indeed the case: The 
cultural distance coefficient is significantly positive indicating that lending shares increase with 
cultural distance. To illustrate the economic relevance of our results in regression 4, consider the 
34.03% average lending share of US arrangers reported in Table 1 as a benchmark. In contrast, 
Austrian arrangers in the early 1990s, who represent the average foreign arranger with a cultural 
distance of 0.73, have to hold almost  a 2% higher lending share (=0.73*2.63). Given the average loan 
size of almost $ 352 million, this 2% higher lending share represents a substantial commitment of the 
arranger to the amount  of $ 7 million. One standard deviation below and above this average cultural 
distance, we find arrangers from Canada and the Netherlands, respectively. Their lending shares are 
1% and 2.7% above those of US arrangers. Finally, arrangers with the largest cultural distance to the 
US, for instance, Chinese arrangers in 1990, need to fund 6.5% more of the loan – equivalent to almost 
$ 23 million –than their US counterparts. Given our moral hazard view of the syndicate loan market, 
this result is consistent with the interpretation that monitoring cost and the arranger’s moral hazard  
                                                          
7
 The coefficients of our other control variables are consistent with the literature. 
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problem increases with cultural distance, and foreign arrangers need an increasingly larger lending 
share to credibly commit to monitoring.  
In Panel B of Table 2 we investigate whether culturally distant arrangers benefit differently 
from information asymmetry reducing circumstances than domestic arrangers. In particular, we 
consider whether borrower transparency, borrower reputation, arranger reputation or previous 
interactions of the lead arranger with the borrower can reduce the moral hazard problem for foreign 
arrangers. We therefore interact cultural distance with opaque borrower, previous borrower, arranger 
reputation and former arranger, respectively. The results in Panel B show that only the latter 
Foreign arranger 1.90 *** 1.32 *
(2.74) (1.88)
Cultural distance 3.21 *** 2.63 *** 3.16 ** 2.88 *** 2.53 *** 4.28 ***
(3.77) (3.06) (2.55) (2.98) (3.17) (4.28)
Opaque borrower 0.35 0.36 0.46 0.36 0.36 0.39
(0.64) (0.66) (0.79) (0.65) (0.65) (0.70)
Previous borrower -0.51 -0.51 -0.51 -0.45 -0.51 -0.53
(-1.27) (-1.28) (-1.29) (-1.05) (-1.28) (-1.32)
Arranger reputation -61.53 *** -59.19 *** -59.05 *** -59.22 *** -59.40 *** -58.22 ***
(-4.42) (-4.27) (-4.56) (-4.57) (-4.58) (-4.50)
Former arranger -1.29 *** -1.27 ** -1.27 ** -1.28 ** -1.27 ** -0.82
(-2.62) (-2.58) (-2.47) (-2.50) (-2.49) (-1.52)
Cultural distance * opaque borrower -0.83
(-0.54)
Cultural distance * previous borrower -0.48
(-0.42)
Cultural distance * arranger reputation 74.31
(0.37)
Cultural distance * former arranger -3.74 **
(-2.52)
Borrower size -0.90 *** -0.76 *** -0.91 *** -0.77 *** -0.77 *** -0.77 *** -0.77 *** -0.79 ***
(-4.07) (-3.39) (-4.13) (-3.44) (-3.75) (-3.77) (-3.77) (-3.84)
Loan size -12.20 *** -12.02 *** -12.17 *** -12.00 *** -12.00 *** -12.00 *** -12.00 *** -11.99 ***
(-38.94) (-37.63) (-38.86) (-37.58) (-45.99) (-46.01) (-46.00) (-45.97)
Loan maturity -3.68 *** -3.76 *** -3.69 *** -3.76 *** -3.76 *** -3.76 *** -3.76 *** -3.77 ***
(-8.75) (-8.91) (-8.77) (-8.93) (-10.29) (-10.27) (-10.27) (-10.30)
Senior -4.94 *** -4.83 *** -4.87 *** -4.77 *** -4.79 *** -4.77 *** -4.77 *** -4.76 ***
(-3.59) (-3.52) (-3.54) (-3.48) (-3.94) (-3.92) (-3.92) (-3.91)
Secured 1.41 *** 1.38 *** 1.40 *** 1.37 ** 1.37 *** 1.37 *** 1.37 *** 1.37 ***
(2.64) (2.59) (2.63) (2.57) (2.66) (2.65) (2.65) (2.66)
Covenants -0.37 -0.15 -0.34 -0.12 -0.12 -0.11 -0.12 -0.12
(-0.60) (-0.23) (-0.54) (-0.19) (-0.16) (-0.16) (-0.16) (-0.17)
Multiple tranches 0.84 0.85 0.87 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.85
(1.43) (1.44) (1.47) (1.47) (1.50) (1.50) (1.50) (1.48)
Dummies:
  Borrower industry yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
  Loan type yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
  Loan purpose yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
  Year of loan signing yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Adjusted R
2
0.435 0.438 0.436 0.438 0.438 0.438 0.438 0.438
Number of observations 8,031 8,031 8,031 8,031 8,031 8,031 8,031 8,031
Dependent variable: Arranger's lending share
This table presents OLS regression results. For each independent variable the top row reports the estimated coefficient and the bottom row reports the t-
statistic. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel B: Mitigating Moral Hazard
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Table 2
Syndicate Structure Analysis
Panel A: Cultural Distance 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
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interaction effect has a significantly negative coefficient. We interpret this as evidence that past 
interactions of the culturally distant arrangers with the borrower, can reduce the moral hazard problem 
for these arrangers. These arrangers do not need to incur high cost of monitoring because they have 
already exerted efforts to acquire such information in the past. Thus, the foreign arranger’s lending 
share increases with cultural distance; it does so only for lead arrangers who have no prior lending 
relationship with the borrower. In this sense, familiarity eliminates the moral hazard problem.  
In order to check whether our main results (regression 4 in Panel B of Table 2) are robust, we 
conduct two sets of robustness checks. Firstly, we consider different cultural proxies. At the most 
simple level, geographical distance or no common border can be indicative of cultural distance (Glick 
and Rose, 2002; Rose, 2004). Similarly, a different language or a different legal origin can be 
considered (Buch and Lipponer, 2007; Glick and Rose, 2002; Heuchemer et al., 2009). Regarding the 
latter, La Porta et al. (2008:326) focus on the differences between common versus civil law and argue 
that “legal origins—broadly interpreted as highly persistent systems of social control of economic 
life—have significant consequences for the legal and regulatory framework of the society, as well as 
for economic outcomes”. Finally, specific proxies of business culture or national culture exist. Here, 
two broader measures dominate the business and economic literature on culture: management science 
prefers Hofstede’s (1980) cultural dimensions while the economic literature often concentrates on trust 
(Ekinci et al., 2007; Guiso et al., 2009; Heuchemer et al., 2009; Sapienza et al., 2013; Siegel et al., 
2011; Stulz and Williamson, 2003). We thus create two proxies: cultural distanceHofstede and cultural 
distancetrust. In our sample, these different cultural measures are highly correlated with correlation 
coefficients between 0.70 and 0.99 and a principal components analysis indicates the existence of a 
single factor.
8
 We take this as evidence that these different measures mostly reflect the same cultural 
aspects and we thus consider each proxy individually. With the exception of cultural distancetrust, the 
cultural distance coefficients are positive and significant in Panel A of Table 3 and the interaction 
effects are robust. This confirms our conclusion that familiarity reduces moral hazard problem. 
Secondly, we reconsider our assumption that cultural distance is determined by the country in which 
                                                          
8
 Details are available upon request. 
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Cultural distance proxy
Panel A: Cultural distance based on the country of the arranger's headquarters
Cultural distance 4.28 *** 0.23 *** 17.91 0.52 *** 3.04 *** 3.01 * 3.10 *
(4.28) (3.30) (1.53) (2.97) (2.61) (1.87) (1.91)
Cultural distance * former arranger -3.74 ** -0.22 ** -20.85 -0.43 * -2.77 * -4.56 ** -4.77 **
(-2.52) (-2.30) (-1.32) (-1.86) (-1.83) (-2.17) (-2.27)
Panel B: Cultural distance based on the country of the arranger's office
Cultural distance 4.13 *** 0.22 *** 16.94 0.52 ** 3.20 ** 4.37 ** 4.14 **
(2.98) (2.97) (1.38) (2.55) (2.31) (2.51) (2.54)
Cultural distance * former arranger -4.39 ** -0.25 ** -19.69 -0.53 ** -3.39 * -5.74 ** -5.21 ***
(-2.40) (-2.44) (-1.19) (-1.98) (-1.89) (-2.56) (-2.66)
This table presents OLS regression results. Regression 1 in Panel replicates our benchmark regression, e.g. regression 4 in Panel B of Table 2. For each independent
variable the top row reports the estimated coefficient and the bottom row reports the t-statistic. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust. ***, ** and * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Cultural 
distanceIW
(1)
Different legal 
origin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Table 3
Alternative Cultural Distance Proxies
Dependent variable: Arranger's lending share
Cultural 
distanceHofstede
Cultural 
distanceTrust 
Geographical 
distance
No common 
border
Different 
language
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the arranger’s headquarters are located.9 As DealScan indicates which office arranges the loan, we use 
the office’s country instead.  This affects 351 of our 8,031 deals, most of which are now assigned to 
the US. Results are robust as Panel B in Table 3 indicates.
10
 
 
4. Summary and conclusion 
This study shows the impact cultural differences between arrangers and borrowers have on the 
structure of the loan syndicate. We discover that foreign arrangers tend to form more concentrated 
syndicates and that this concentration increases with cultural distance. As delegated monitors, they 
have to incur higher cost when gathering information about the borrower and consequently, there 
exists a moral hazard problem for distant arrangers whose monitoring efforts are not observable. This 
moral hazard problem increases with monitoring cost. In order to ensure due diligence towards the 
syndicate’s other participants, arrangers use their higher lending share of the loan as a commitment 
device. However, a weaker commitment device in form of a lower lending share is sufficient for 
distant arrangers who have arranged loans for the borrower in the past – supporting the interpretation, 
that information gathering costs are the core drivers of our results. These results hold even after 
controlling different dimensions of information asymmetry such as opaqueness of the borrower, 
borrower reputation or arranger reputation. Overall, we conclude that despite all the technological 
advancements, the global syndicated loan market is still not integrated and that cultural proximity of 
lenders to borrowers continues to be of great importance. 
 
  
                                                          
9
 We are thankful to the anonymous reviewer for drawing our attention to this highly relevant issue. 
10
 We conduct additional robustness checks regarding sample size (reduced sample excluding club deals, project 
finance loans and loans to financial institutions and REITS) and methodology (standard errors clustered by 
arranger or arranger country). Results are overall robust. We also consider sample selection,  in particular the 
potentially non-random matching of culturally distant lead arrangers to borrowers. Specifically, we estimate a 
Heckman selection model. The coefficient of the Inverse Mills ratio is insignificant, the coefficient of our 
cultural distance proxy is positive and significant but the interaction effect with former arranger is insignificant. 
While we believe to have addressed the sample-selection issue as far as possible, these coefficient patterns are 
not strong enough for us to conclude the absence of selection biases. All results including the detailed results 
underlying Table 3 are available upon request. 
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Appendix 
 
 
  
Dependent variable
Arranger's lending share Percentage of the deal funded by the lead arranger (1 = 1%). Lead arrangers are identified by 
DealScan's "Lead Arranger" field and - if missing - by the banks listed in the lead role in the "All 
Lenders" field. Lending shares are obtained from the "All Lenders" field.
Independent variables
Foreign arranger Dummy = 1 if the lead arranger is headquartered outside the US, 0 otherwise.
Cultural distance              
(cultural distanceIW)
Euclidean distance of the average of Inglehart and Welzel's (2005) traditional vs. secular-rational 
values and survival vs. self-expression values of the lead arranger country vis à vis the US.  
Culture distanceHofstede Euclidean distance of the average of Hofstede's individualism, masculinity, power distance and 
uncertainity avoidance of the country of the lead arranger vis à vis the US. Source: Hofstede (1980).
Cultural distanceTrust Euclidean distance of the degree of trust of the country of the lead arranger vis à vis the US.  Source: 
World Value Survey. Question regarding "most people can be trusted".  We use the weighted 
average of the results of all 5 waves where the number of participants who answer the question is 
used as weights.Geographical distance Physical distance between the headquarter of the country of the lead arranger and the US in 
thousands of kilometers. Source: Great Circle Distances Between Capital Cities, at 
http://www.chemical-ecology.net/ java/capitals.htm.
No common border Dummy = 1 if lead arranger is from a country that does not share a common land border with the US. 
Source: CIA World Factbook.
Different language Dummy = 1 if the lead arranger is from a country that does not use the same language as the US 
(English). Source: CIA World Factbook.
Different legal origin Dummy = 1 if the lead arranger is from a civil law country. Source: CIA World Factbook.
Opaque borrower Dummy = 1 if the borrower does not have both, an S&P senior debt rating and a ticker at the time of 
loan signing, 0 otherwise.
Previous borrower Natural logarithm of 1 plus the number of loans raised by the borrower in the 5 years prior to loan 
signing.
Arranger reputation Market share of the arranger in the US syndicated loan market the year prior to loan signing 
(0.01=1%). 
Former arranger Dummy = 1 if lead arranger has been lead arranger to the same borrower in the 5 years prior to loan 
signing, 0 otherwise.
Borrower size Natural logarithm of the borrower's sales volume in US dollars at the time of loan signing.
Loan size Natural logarithm of the deal size in US dollars at the time of loan signing.
Loan maturity Natural logarithm of average maturity across all tranches belonging to the same deal, measured in 
days.
Senior Dummy = 1 if the deal is senior, 0 otherwise.
Secured Dummy = 1 if the deal is secured, 0 otherwise.
Covenants Dummy = 1 if the deal has one or more financial covenants, 0 otherwise.
Multiple tranches Dummy = 1 if the deal consists of more than one tranche, 0 otherwise.
Borrower industry dummies Dummies based on all categories in Dealscan's "Major Industry Group" field.
Loan type dummies Dummies based on DealScan's "Specific Tranche Type" field: revolver, term loan, other.
Loan purpose dummies Dummies based on DealScan's "Primary Loan Purpose" field: working capital, acquisition, general 
corporate purpose, debt repayment, other.
Year of loan signing dummies Dummies based on DealScan's "Year" field.
Table A1
Variable Definitions and Sources
Unless otherwise indicated the variables are calculated based on data obtained from the Loan Pricing Corporation's DealScan
database.
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